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The goal of this article is to clarify some ways of look-
ing at the world and to point out the implication of
those ways for family medicine. I will use distinc-
tions made by both men and women writers, but I
will draw most heavily on a recent study about how
women come to know about the world, called
Women’s Ways of Knowing.1 This book offers an un-
derstanding central for family medicine in thinking
about the problem of research: that those who have
less power in the world have more difficulty finding
their voice and that their way of listening, learning,
and speaking about what they know is essentially dif-
ferent from the way that those in power hold forth.
In recent years, a number of authors have begun to
draw distinctions between two different ways of find-
ing out about the world. The names of the two differ-
ent ways vary by the authors: Bruner writes about the
paradigmatic versus narrative ways;2 Kuzel describes
rationalistic versus naturalistic knowing3 (see page 665
in this issue); Stephens talks about seeing versus hear-
ing;4 and, most recently, Belenky et al describe sepa-
rate versus connected knowing.1
Bruner describes the two modes of thought as:
. . . irreducible to one another . . . . (I)n their full
development, the one seeks explications that are con-
text free and universal, the other seeks explications
that are context sensitive and particular.2
Bruner’s paradigmatic mode (also known as the
logico-scientific mode) is based on categorization and
the methods by which categories are linked to each
other to form systems; based on consistency and non-
contradiction, this mode tests hypotheses to arrive at
empirical truth. Bruner describes the narrative mode
as working in two “landscapes” simultaneously: the
landscape of action (ie, the plot, the agent, the goal)
and the landscape of consciousness (what the actors
know, think, or feel). While believability is the touch-
stone of narrative, falsifiability is the standard of the
scientific method.5 We shall return to this distinction
in a later section.
What the family physician does when she or he
sees a patient in the office is closer to constructing a
believable account in Bruner’s narrative mode than it
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is to proving an empiric hypothesis in the paradig-
matic mode. What I wish to argue in this paper is that
our research should therefore begin as an amplifica-
tion of this familiar narrative mode instead of insist-
ing that research to be valid must fall within the
logico-scientific frame.
In our own literature, Kuzel has drawn a similar
distinction between rationalistic inquiry (what is usu-
ally taken to be the traditional scientific method) and
naturalistic inquiry.3 Kuzel distinguishes between the
different forms of trustworthiness recognized by the
two forms of inquiry: for instance, the rationalistic
mode uses the criteria on internal and external valid-
ity; the naturalistic mode depends on credibility. He
also points out the differences in the investigator’s
stance: objectivity, with all its implications of distance
and separateness, is central to the rationalistic mode.
What Kuzel calls reflexivity is the stance of the natu-
ralistic observer who consistently examines the con-
tribution of his or her own perspective and interpre-
tation to the investigation at hand. We will return again
to the concepts of credibility and refexivity in the next
section. Kuzel goes on to articulate in detail the im-
plication of these alternative models for research.
Stephens has recently drawn the distinction be-
tween seeing and hearing as two different avenues
that lead to two different understandings of patients.4
Twentieth century medicine respects the primacy of
what can be seen; our capacities to generate visual
images of our patients’ bodies have expanded far more
rapidly than we could have imagined only 20 years
ago. At the same time, our abilities to hear patients
have probably not grown and may indeed have atro-
phied further. It is this listening/hearing that allows
our imaginations to become open to the imaginations,
the hopes and fears, of our patients. In hearing and
listening we take the other into ourselves. This is the
sensory correlate of the kind of knowing I have been
describing.
The concepts of separate and connected knowing
are helpful in gaining legitimacy for a crucial theme
in family medicine, the importance of knowing the
patient. Four women psychologists have written a
pathmaking book called Women’s Ways of Knowing.1
They felt that how women come to learn about the
world differs from how men come to do it; to exam-
ine this possibility, they interviewed hundreds of
women, some several times over a period of years,
asking how they describe themselves, how they see
themselves in relationships, how they see themselves
in the world, how they come to learn and to know,
and how they see, identify, and solve moral problems.
The authors describe a sequence of ways that women
come to learn about the world and themselves in that
world. In particular, they demonstrate the relevance
of this sequence to the process of gaining an education.
One of the later steps in learning Belenky et al call
“procedural knowing.” This is the kind of learning
that goes on primarily in academic settings, where
students learn the methods of argument and analysis
of each discipline. Form is more important than con-
tent; how you set about it is more important than the
position you take. While many different interpreta-
tions of a piece of work are possible, not all are equally
valid. In contrast to the previous stage of subjective
knowing, at this time, an excess of personal involve-
ment in interpretation is suspect. Much of family
medicine education goes on at this stage: residents
learn the essentials of our methods but have difficulty
seeing the importance of their own or the patient’s
unique personal contributions to solving common
problems in our work.
Family medicine research goes on more actively
at the subsequent step of separate knowing. Based on
critical thinking, objectivity, and reason, separate
knowing actively excludes the self. Separate knowers
willingly confront authorities, using rhetorical skills
and highly polished arguments. But, the women
Belenky et al interviewed at this stage felt a particu-
lar emptiness and pointlessness in their success.
Separate knowing stands in sharp contrast to con-
nected knowing, which is built on the belief that “trust-
worthy knowledge comes from personal experience
rather than the pronouncements of authorities.”1(pp.112-3)
Connected knowers seek to find out about the other
person’s experience; in family medicine, we usually
set about this by actively trying to find out what the
other person is experiencing—to know how he or she
is perceiving the world.
Separate knowers learn through explicit formal in-
struction how to adopt a different lens—how, for ex-
ample, to think like a sociologist. Connected knowers
learn through empathy. Both learn to get out from
behind their own eyes and use a different lens, in one
case the lens of a discipline, in the other the lens of
another person.1(p.115)
In these terms, I would argue that the long-term
practice of family medicine goes on at the level of
connected knowing, while our research stays confined
to separate knowing. The resultant disjunction pro-
duces practitioners who do not write and researchers
who do not practice.
Belenky’s group found that through connected
knowing a woman would come to learn about another
person or about a written work or an art form by tak-
ing it into herself, finding the ways in which she can
see the world from the point of view of the other. The
other is no longer “out there” but also within. Such
connected knowing is not strictly defined along gen-
der lines, but the separate way of knowing is clearly
Special Series: Classics From Family Medicine
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more compatible with male sex role socialization,
which emphasizes and depends on male separateness,6
while connected knowing is more compatible with
the way women are socialized to see relationships as
the central activity in their lives.7,8 Although the term
connected knowing has been put forward by femi-
nists, I am not making the claim that only women
think this way; on the contrary, I suspect that many, if
not most, men in family medicine think this way as
well but may feel guilty about it! After all, men are
even more strongly socialized to think that only ra-
tional, emotion-free objectivity is the proper way to
look at the world.
What all these descriptions—Bruner, Kuzel,
Stephens, and the Belenky group—have in common
is the recognition that a certain way of finding out
about and knowing the world has held the dominant
position in academia—not only in the natural sciences
and the social sciences but also in the arts and hu-
manities. Despite the popularity of the idea of scien-
tific revolutions, in science and medicine the reign-
ing viewpoint remains the positivist conception of
science. The other way of knowing and finding out is
now starting to make itself heard. Unfortunately, in
family medicine, in the pursuit of academic credibil-
ity, we have up to the present failed to acknowledge
the legitimacy of our customary way of knowing and
instead have attempted in our research and our writ-
ings to employ what is more accepted as the scien-
tific way of knowing. Since this is not actually our
primary way of working and learning, it is no sur-
prise that up until the present, our research and our
practice remain so disconnected.
 What I would like to do now is to take four dis-
tinct features of these different ways of knowing and
point out family medicine’s legitimacy as a discipline
of connected knowing, to use the Belenky term. The
four features I will discuss are only some of many—
but the comparisons will begin to shape the outlines
of a world view familiar to family medicine but not
considered as a legitimate way of thinking.
1. Context
In naturalistic or connected knowing, the context
is central to understanding the person or situation with
which we are faced. We feel we do not have a good
fix on something until we have a feel for the surround-
ings in which it is embedded. The goal of this stand-
point is a comprehension of the uniqueness of this
person’s situation, illness, or recovery. Individual,
family, or n of 1 studies followed over long periods
of time can exemplify research in this framework. In
contrast, rationalistic or separate knowing relies on
removing the phenomenon from its context and iso-
lating the elements with the goal of establishing a use-
ful generalization, law, or rule about such instances.
This approach seeks to strip away differences look-
ing for common elements that bind examples together.
Controlled trials are a paramount example of this way
of thinking.
2. Time Span
Narrative or naturalistic knowing relies on obser-
vations, if you will, made over a prolonged span of
time. When we have not been present in the pasts of
our patients, we use tools like the genogram or life
story to explore their pasts. Our present work is predi-
cated on maintaining our connections over a long
enough time span to participate in the unfolding of
the individual and family narrative. Stephens has high-
lighted the importance of this historical perspective
for individual patients in his work on clinical biogra-
phies9 and careers of illness.10 The prime example of
work focused on families within a community was
conducted by F.J.A. Huygen11 in his monumental work
tracing the family medical histories of hundreds of
Dutch families for up to four generations. In contrast,
the attention span of most North American research
is very short; for example, a recent retrospective study
on the “natural history” of palpitations12 studied pa-
tients with a mean age of 43 for a mean period of 41
months. While all clinical work must pay some at-
tention to the role of time, as in the “history of the
present illness,” the customary dominant view in clini-
cal research is far more cross-sectional than longitu-
dinal in constructing an understanding of what is go-
ing on.
3. Believability
Narrative is about “the working out of human in-
tentions in a real or possible world.”2(p.106) One of the
assessments of a narrative lies in its believability. In
family medicine, we must initially listen to and ac-
cept the story the person tells us about himself or her-
self. In clinical care, this stance is exemplified by our
approach to the child who tells us that he or she has
been sexually abused. We must act based on our be-
lief that the narrative is true. Our job is not to dis-
prove the statement but rather to begin our work based
on the likelihood that it is true.
Using disprovability in contrast to believability, the
paradigmatic, or rational world, is evaluated through
“the operations of causes, structural requiredness,
reasoned correlation.’’2(p.106) To test hypotheses in this
framework, we attempt to disprove them. Both the
judicial system and the scientific hypothetico-deduc-
tive systems function to attempt to disprove hypoth-
eses. Belenky et al said,
Presented with a proposition, separate knowers
immediately look for something wrong—a loophole,
a factual error, a logical contradiction, the omission
of contrary evidence.2(p.104)
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Belenky et al found that women were uncom-
fortable with doubting—that they either saw it as a
game or as something threatening to their relation-
ships with others where someone might get hurt.
Doubting requires a particular suspiciousness of the
person’s involvement in his/her story and in that
person’s own personal responses to it: doubting re-
lies on the removal of self or objectivity. Believing,
in contrast, felt real to the women Belenky’s group
interviewed,
Perhaps because it is founded on genuine care and
because it promises to reveal the kind of truth they
value—truth that is personal, particular, and grounded
in firsthand experience.1(p.113)
Believing means that you accept as valid another
person’s experience in shaping his or her way of look-
ing at the world, even if you do not share the experi-
ence or viewpoint. The person’s subjectivity is im-
portant in your understanding of the other.
 Research in our discipline based on believability
rests on the assumptions that the narratives that people
tell about themselves make sense, that our job is to
understand the story they tell, to put together the
person’s picture of what is happening. McWhinney
has described this patient-centered activity as “the
transformed clinical method.”13 An example of em-
piric research carried on in this tradition is Schooley’s
inquiry into the emotions patients experienced prior
to an office visit for episodic care.14 Her work dem-
onstrates yet again that if we allow ourselves to hear
what patients are telling us, their expectations and
requests will make far more sense.
4. Empathy
The last set of distinctions I would like to make
between the two ways of looking at the world involve
empathy. The connected knower cares deeply about
the person she or he is learning about; she or he takes
into herself or himself the other’s experience. As in
the narrative, the naturalist, and the hearing modes,
we attempt to let the other in, to allow the other to
speak to us, to listen actively to the one speaking.
This contrasts with the separate stance of the ratio-
nalistic knower for whom feeling is suspect, who
would argue that if you care too much you cannot
exercise rational judgment. Dissection and other vi-
sual modes of finding out about the world are ex-
amples of the practice of separate knowing, from
which caring is best removed. As White pointed out
at the 1986 Society of Teachers of Family Medicine
(STFM) Annual Spring Conference, for rational
knowers, science and caring are two separate activi-
ties—often separated by gender as well.15
These four characteristics—contextuality, life-
history perspective, believability, and empathy—are
strong strands woven into the fabric of connected
knowing. And, it is connected knowing that I have
shown to be integral to our daily practice. Yet, sepa-
rate knowing appears to be an inevitable aspect of
the world of science in which we live and work. Does
the dichotomy between separate and connected rep-
resent an ultimate schism, or can we envision the pos-
sibility of some future synthesis?
Stephens has argued that the narrative form16 and
McWhinney has argued that the naturalist form17 are
in essence forms of observation and are therefore pre-
liminary steps in science making. This posture, how-
ever, implies that they are a more primitive version
of scientific observation as it is classically understood
and therefore are reducible to steps in scientific
method. I disagree; to me, the narrative/naturalist form
is not reducible to observation, particularly because
of the crucial role of the connected self in coming to
understand about the world through this mode. It is
because of connected knowing that family medicine
is a distinct and different entity from other medical
disciplines.
Belenky et al describe the way that women move
beyond the dichotomy between separate and con-
nected: they integrate the voices to create constructed
knowledge. These learners were able to integrate what
they came to understand intuitively and through their
own experience with what they were able to learn
from others. “All knowledge is constructed, and the
knower is an intimate part of the known.”1(p.137) Using
self-knowledge, constructed knowers use themselves
as “an instrument of understanding”l(p.122) In con-
structed knowledge, I seek to unify the pieces of the
whole self—for me, doctor, mother, daughter, lover,
thinker, activist—in my work, avoiding the compart-
mentalization of thinking and feeling, professional and
personal, that tears up my colleagues. It is in this con-
structed knowledge of family medicine that we can
learn to recognize, attend to, and respect the contri-
bution of ourselves as persons to our work with pa-
tients, to accept and value ourselves as an active in-
strument of knowing and of healing.
Constructed knowing requires questioning the as-
sumptions and the frames of knowledge; we begin to
pay attention to the asking, “What is the question?”
And that is what I believe family medicine must do
now—start the process of asking what are the right
questions. Family medicine can listen to the voices
of women coming to find their way of knowing in a
world that has not respected them and can use these
understandings to construct our own knowledge based
on our intimate, personal, long-term connectedness
with our patients. Family medicine, committed to both
Special Series: Classics From Family Medicine
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the personal and the scientific, can choose in our re-
search to blend the visions, highlighting the impor-
tance of the knower and the relationship with the
known. Using this standard, we can sift through all
of the voices we hear and words we read and find
those to which we must listen.
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